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Holdover Time
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| Article Information | ||
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| Category: | Ground Operations | 
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| Content source: | SKYbrary | 
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| Content control: | EUROCONTROL | 
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Description
Holdover Time is the time for which it is expected that a given aircraft treatment by ground anti-icing fluid will remain valid. It is determined by the extent to which it is expected that applied fluid will remain on the aircraft surfaces to the extent necessary to provide protection from the accretion of frozen or semi frozen contaminants in the prevailing conditions. Holdover Time begins at the start of the anti icing operation. If a two-step operation is used, then it begins at the start of the final (anti-icing) step. By definition therefore, holdover time will have effectively run out when frozen deposits start to form or accumulate on treated aircraft surfaces.
Due to their properties, Type I fluids form a thin liquid wetting film, which provides only an extremely limited holdover time, especially in conditions of freezing precipitation. With this type of fluid no additional holdover time can be obtained by increasing the concentration of the fluid in the fluid/water mix. For ‘thickened fluids’ of Type 2, 3 and 4, their pseudo-plastic thickening agent enables the fluid to form a thicker liquid wetting film on aircraft surfaces which can then provide a significantly longer holdover time especially in conditions of continuing freezing precipitation. With this type of fluid additional holdover time will be provided by increasing the concentration of the fluid in the fluid/water mix, with maximum holdover time available from undiluted fluid.
Tables of Holdover Times for different fluids and prevailing conditions are published regularly and provide indication as to the time frame of protection that could reasonably be expected in each situation. These Tables contain elapsed time ranges which represent indicative maximum holdover times. The lower limit of the given time span indicates the estimated time of protection during moderate precipitation of the type stated and the upper limit indicates the estimated time of protection during light Precipitation of the type stated. The prevailing conditions are defined in HOT Tables as:
- Active Frost - means when frost is forming and may occur when an aircraft surface temperature is at or below 0°C273.15 K
32 °F
491.67 °R and also at or below the prevailing Dew Point, - Freezing Fog - fog prevails with an ambient temperature of 0°C273.15 K
32 °F
491.67 °R or below so that rime ice is deposited on exposed surfaces. - Snow/Snow Grains - snow grains are defined as flat in form and with a diameter of less than 1mm and as not bouncing or shattering upon impact with hard ground.
- Freezing Drizzle - uniform precipitation composed exclusively of closely spaced droplets with diameter less than 0.5mm which freezes upon impact with surfaces with a temperature at or below 0°C273.15 K
32 °F
491.67 °R. - Light Freezing Rain - either as freezing drizzle but with widely separated droplets or composed of larger droplets falling at an intensity of no more than 2.5mm liquid water equivalent per hour.
- Rain on Cold Soaked Wing - ‘cold soaked’ is the condition where a wing containing cold fuel acquires as a result a skin temperature at or below 0°C273.15 K
32 °F
491.67 °R and is therefore vulnerable to the formation of clear ice on its surface in moist air up even when this air has a temperature of up to 15°C288.15 K
59 °F
518.67 °R.
Heavy precipitation rates or high moisture content, high wind velocity or jet blast may reduce holdover time below the lowest time stated in the range and holdover times may also be reduced when aircraft skin temperature is lower than OAT.
Holdover time guidelines are published generically for the defined fluid Types 1, 2, 3 and 4 but are also sometimes given for individual fluid products. These “brand name” holdover times will be found to differ from the generic tables. There are no holdover times for Heavy Snow, Hail (defined as ice pieces between 5 and 50mm diameter), Snow or Ice Pellets (defined as hail of less than 5mm in diameter) and Moderate or Heavy Freezing Rain.
Accident and Incident Reports
Accidents and Incidents resulting from airframe icing and problems with anti-icing fluids:
- MD81, vicinity Stockholm Sweden, 1991 (GND HF LOC FIRE) (On 27 December 1991, after take-off from Arlanda Airport, Stockholm, an MD-81 operated by Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), experienced a failure of both engines following the ingestion of clear ice detaching from the wings. Subsequently, the crew executed a successful forced landing.)
- CL60, Montrose USA, 2004 (GND LOC HF FIRE) (On 28 November 2004, a Challeger 601 operated by Global Aviation crashed on takeoff from Montrose, Colorado, USA, following loss of control due to airframe icing.)
- C208, vicinity Pelee Island Canada, 2004 (WX HF GND LOC) (On 17 January, 2004 a Cessna 208 Caravan operated by Georgian Express, took off from Pellee Island, Ontario, Canada, at a weight significantly greater than maximum permitted and with ice visible on the airframe. Shortly after take off, the pilot lost control of the aircraft and it crashed into a frozen lake.)
- ATP, Helsinki Finland, 2010 (RE AW GND) (On 11 January 2010, a British Aerospace ATP being operated by West Air Sweden on a cargo flight from Helsinki to Copenhagen with only the two operating flight crew on board at night could not be rotated for take off on runway 22R. The ensuing rejected take off in normal ground visibility was achieved within the available runway length and the aircraft was undamaged and returned to the apron.)
- RJ1H, Zurich Switzerland, 2006 (GND FIRE HF) (On 26 January 2006, an Avro RJ100 being operated by Swiss European on a scheduled passenger service from Hanover to Zurich had reached the parking gate at destination in normal day visibility when a flash fire occurred following the connection of ground electrical power. The commander ordered an emergency evacuation but since the air bridge was already in position at the aircraft, the cabin crew decided to carry out a rapid disembarkation and all passengers and cabin crew were off the aircraft within two minutes. A flight deck fire extinguisher was used against the apparent origin of the fire, the vicinity of the First Officer’s rudder pedals.)
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Related Articles
Further Reading
- AEA Recommendations for De-icing/Anti-Icing: The two regularly updated AEA Guides on the subject are: